Exile, Science, and Bildung

The Contested Legacies of German Emigre Intellectuals

EDITED BY
David Kettler
and
Gerhard Lauer
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GERHARD LAUER. Literature, University of Goettingen. Author: Die Verspätete Revolution (1995) and coeditor of volumes on problems of social history and literature, the return of the author.

REINHARD MEHRING. Institute of Philosophy, Humbold University, Berlin. Author: Thomas Mann: Artist and Philosopher (2001); Introduction to Carl Schmitt (2001).


ERNST OSTERKAMP. Literature. Humboldt University, Berlin. Author of numerous books and articles on German literature, with special interest in boundary between art and literature and the recent history of German “Bildung.”


ANNA WESSELY. Art History and Sociology. Professor of Sociology, Eötvös Loránd University and Senior Fellow, Humanities Center, Central European University, Budapest. Editor of the Budapest Review of Books, author of articles on Simmel, Mannheim, eighteenth century philosophy, and contemporary art.

THOMAS WHEATLAND. Editorial Acquisition Department, Harvard University Press (Ph.D. in European and U.S. Intellectual History from Boston College, 2002). Author: Articles and a manuscript under development on the exile, history, and reception of the “Frankfurt School” in the United States.

IRVING WOHLFARTH. Professor of German Literature, Reims. Editor and contributor, Nietzsche and an “Architecture of our Minds” (1999); Speak Of Camps; Think of Genocide (1999).

JERRY ZASLOVE. Professor emeritus Literature and Humanities, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, British Columbia Canada, monographs on Kafka, anarchism and culture, dialogic approaches to art and culture, recent publications on Siegfried Kracauer, Jeff Wall, Herbert Read and utopic modernism, and, forthcoming, on the death of the university, as well as an edited book of essays on Arnold Hauser.
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Notes


The recognition of a difference between the scientific dimension of institutionalized knowledge in society and the rhetorical, didactic one, as well as the potential for conflict between them, is by no means unique to modern German culture. For centuries, English universities put the formation of clergymen and gentlemen ahead of the advancement of knowledge, and American colleges vied with each other in adapting both instruction and inquiry to the building of piety or moral character or civic virtue, not to speak of the utilitarian didactic achievements of inculcating commercial initiative or housewifely guile. Francis Bacon and Adam Smith denounced Oxford and Cambridge early in the modern era, and their spiritual heirs later created the London School of Economics, while the protests of Charles Beard and Thorstein Veblen against the higher education in America helped to bring into being the New School that was eventually to harbor an important contingent of the German émigrés of 1933.

Yet neither in England nor the United States did questions arising out of the contrasting aims of organized knowledge penetrate so deeply into competing designs of such knowledge, lay claim to such comprehensive ethical significance, resonate so profoundly in public discourses remote from debates about education in the narrower sense, or have such ambitions on the allocation of authority and power in society. Some of these themes doubtless arose among essayists elsewhere, as with Matthew Arnold or T. S. Eliot in Britain, or Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry Thoreau in the United States, but the comprehensiveness, centrality, and pervasiveness of the problem constellation was distinctively German, as was its extension to spheres of discourse remote from the essayistic. The conception of Germany as uniquely a Kulturnation and of cultural policy consequently as the subject matter of prime political decisions was admittedly undermined by the defeat in World War I, which had been marked by this ideological motif, but in the world of the literary intelligentsia the conception revived in diverse forms during the Weimar years.

In the various discourses centered in the university faculties of philosophy, especially within the humanities and social studies, intellectual work in Germany was
commonly scrutinized for its stand on the issues between Bildung (broad cultivation) and Wissenschaft (specialized research science), even if its substance was remote from pedagogical questions. The interrogation was a “philosophical” one, whether the writers sought to contribute to “orientation,” to counter the loss of meaning widely associated with the explosion of modernity, or whether they were engaged in “specialist” science “for its own sake.”

For the intellectuals forced into emigration by the Hitler regime, this dimension of their past intellectual activity, as well as the souvenirs of their participation in controversies about the supposed “crisis” of Bildung in the decades before 1933 remained a persistent presence. With their faces toward Germany, moreover, many of the émigrés grounded their claims to represent the “other,” better Germany precisely on the charge that the Nazis had betrayed the Bildung ideal and practice that the emigration was safeguarding in exile. In their relations with English and American intellectual life, however, in the processes of acculturation that was a response to necessities as well as attractions, the older, “philosophical” context frequently appeared exaggerated and professionally unsound. These currents and countercurrents are differently managed by the émigré authors.

To add to the complexity of the situation, many of the elements of the core German Bildung tradition, the canonized names and poses, as well as the reputation of uncompromising German Wissenschaft, enjoyed high status in the significantly different setting of American campaigns against shallow moralism, commercialism, or hyper-specialization in higher education, notwithstanding the estrangement of the war years, 1917–1918. The high standing of German universities among American professors, especially of the older generation, was both evidenced and reinforced by the considerable number of them who had done a Wanderjahr of advanced study there, as a matter of course. Since late in the nineteenth century, moreover, the debate about American higher education was strongly influenced by conflicting citations of German models, a pattern of argument emphatically renewed by Abraham Flexner in his widely discussed Universities—American, English, German, published in 1930, on the eve of the post-1933 emigrations. The exchange between Flexner and his critics offers a unique insight into the patterns of expectations—accepting or disparaging—that confronted émigré scholars, scientists, and intellectuals when they came, inescapably as Germans, to the American academic world.

The Academic Landscape in America: The Reception of Abraham Flexner’s Idealization of German Universities

Flexner argued that neither American nor English institutions of higher education were more than secondary schools, in the last analysis, while Germany alone, building on the historic initiatives of Wilhelm von Humboldt, knew genuine universities. Above all, Flexner attacked the incorporation of vocational and “professional” training into the university. Only law may be included and medicine belongs, since these entail both rigorous scientific disciplines and humanitarian ideals. German students were brought to maturity, he contended, by their experience in the academic secondary schools, whose high standards were safeguarded by the nationwide Matura examination; and the universities were free to serve disciplined scholarship and
science alone, without regard to the paternalistic or ad hoc utilitarian concerns of schools in the United States.

Flexner was an influential commentator at the time, an educationist whose power was by no means limited to the force of his public arguments. Although his retirement from his position as Secretary of the General Education Board—the Rockefellers' first educational philanthropy—was not altogether voluntary, he remained well connected with major donors in the field of education, respectful of his remarkable record. His proposals for massive reform in medical education, first in 1910 for the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and later for the General Education Board, had been backed up by conditional foundation grants, whose terms he materially shaped, as was his scheme for a progressive secondary school, implemented in the Lincoln School at Teachers College, Columbia. To judge by the accounts in his autobiography, Flexner must have generated and programmed the expenditure of more than $60,000,000 on higher education during his years with Carnegie and Rockefeller. Within a year of the publication of his 1930 critique of American universities, moreover, he had been given the endowment funds to establish the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. Even at the age of seventy, in short, he was a force that could not be ignored. He was in a unique position to renew public interest in the arguments based on idealized German school and university models that had been pushed aside by the ideological mobilization against Germany in World War I, the fear of Socialist influences from Germany in the postwar period, the distrust among social scientists and publicists of the "philosophical" and antiscientific motifs in German books such as Spengler's *Decline of the West*, and the celebration of new American models. After April 1933, then, he was also among the first to act on his admiration of the German academic tradition by assisting in the placement of distinguished émigrés.

Yet it would be a mistake, first, to confuse Flexner's thesis with an importation of the German debate about *Bildung* as it had developed during the Weimar years, with its presumed bearing on the philosophical aims and designs of knowledge, especially since he shows no awareness of the division between *Bildung* and *Wissenschaft* featured in the debate about the supposed "crisis of *Bildung*" in Germany. The actual Weimar debate compounded themes initiated in the nineteenth century by Nietzsche's assertions of the claims of "life" against the "dead knowledge" of the *Bildung* tradition, with ideas arising in the context of newly assertive social movements, to challenge the *Wissenschaften* at home in the universities, in a state of the question remote from the conjunction of the two concepts in the earlier idealistic ideology put forward in the name of Humboldt and still credited by Flexner. The debate about Max Weber's "Science as a Vocation" was the prime locus for this new turn in old arguments.

A number of the exiled intellectuals had been among those who sought for some mediation of the conflict, following the line laid down by Georg Simmel, whose authority outlived his death at the beginning of the epoch:

Anyone who has been active for decades in the academic sphere and who enjoys the trust of the youth knows how often it is precisely the inwardly most alive and idealistic young men who turn away in disappointment, after a few semesters, from what the
university offers them in the way of general Bildung, the satisfaction of their innermost needs. For what they want, quite apart from the most outstanding instruction of a specialized and exact kind, is something more general or, if you like, something more personal. . . Call this, if you like, a mere by-product of Wissenschaft, . . . but, if it is no longer offered to young people, the best among them will turn to other sources that promise to satisfy these deepest needs: to mysticism or to what they call “life,” to social democracy or to literature in general, to a misunderstood Nietzsche or to a materialism tinged with scepticism. Let us not deceive ourselves. The German universities have largely surrendered the inner leadership of the youth to forces of this kind.3

Flexner knew nothing about this distinctive German theme of inner, subjective development, or about the conception of the “youth” as impatient, assertive actor in the struggle for Bildung. The emigrants brought these additional questions and expectations, as well as, for many of the Jews among them, the contradictory experience of the transmutation of Bildung from entryway into exclusionary formula, as Bildung had become a motto of anti-Enlightenment, Gemeinschaft-centered opinion in the course of the struggle with Wissenschaft.4 Flexner’s attempted revival of earlier American idealization of German university culture itself stands for a pattern of demands on the exiles that many of them will find puzzling and some will experience as demeaning, while others will use them as a route of access to academic standing. Second, it would be an error to suppose that Flexner’s undoubted capacity to gain attention for his theses about the superiority of the German universities meant that he could also redefine the field. The Journal of Higher Education, founded at the Ohio State University in the year that Flexner’s book appeared, devoted its entire October, 1931 issue to reviews of Flexner’s Universities; and these provide a valuable guide to American academic understandings of and responses to such challenges, as well as a preview of the context within which the German émigrés would have to find their way and their place a few years later.

The editor of the journal, W. W. Charters, may be excused the irritation expressed in his conclusion that Flexner only uses ridicule because he “has wholly missed the point” of university people trying to meet state-imposed obligations for professional training in vital social domains. Two of Charter’s own studies are the object of almost three pages of such ridicule.5 Charters grants Flexner that he has justly depicted the “Valhalla” of the research professor, but he denies that this addresses any of the real problems posed by the need to unite practice with knowledge, as a result of the “profound social forces which swept through the university to produce the professional schools.” Another Ohio State professor, the philosopher, B. H. Bode, is more sympathetic to Flexner’s critique of much American practice, but he finds a contradiction between, on the one hand, Flexner’s abrupt disjuncture between secondary school Bildung and university research and, on the other, his insistence that university work too must be charged with “cultural values” and dedication to social intelligence. The failure to define either of those key concepts, as well as the contradiction itself, is, according to Bode, “apparently due to the fact that Mr. Flexner [ . . . ] takes over the [ . . . ] German conception of culture, lock, stock, and barrel.” Once it is recognized that the unfinished search for cultural values cannot be packaged in an authoritarian transmission of traditional ideas, as the Germans do, there is no further reason to draw Flexner’s sharp line between school and university—and the liberal
arts college comes back into its own. Bode closes with the ironic compliment that the book "may be expected to assist modern education in sloughing off a tradition from which the author himself has been unable to escape."6

Perhaps the most pointed criticism of Flexner's idealization of German models is made by the associate editor of the journal, W. H. Cowley, soon to be president of Hamilton College. In part, he is simply angry at Flexner's disdain of empirical research as a route to reform of higher education, but, more interestingly, he opposes Flexner as the main protagonist of "the German scholarly ideal," prevalent among graduate-studies-centered universities whose demands (and graduates) have ever more overshadowed "the traditional American ideal of the broad, symmetrical education of the individual." He speaks of mounting protest at the Association of American Colleges and increasing calls to action against the subordination of higher education to the purely intellectual interests of a tiny minority, at the sacrifice of the democratic requirement of an "enlightened citizenry." A criticism similarly discomfited by what it takes to be Flexner's unreflective preference for a "feudal-aristocratic place of intelligence" rather than a democratic, practical one is especially noteworthy because it comes from William H. Kilpatrick, second only to Dewey in his importance for progressive education and a major figure in the development of the Lincoln School at Columbia Teachers College, which Flexner himself had originally brought into being. Unlike most of the other commentators, Kilpatrick takes note of Flexner's progressive strand, unparalleled in most German arguments, the suggestion that the autonomous research university is essential precisely because no other agency will provide the critical analysis of a "society that is driven it knows not whither by forces of unprecedented violence." Yet he objects that this is negated by Flexner's formalism, his "classical" penchant for neatly dividing school from university, Bildung from science, the learned from the rest. "Each idea and class must stand apart," Kilpatrick writes, "nicely bounded, not—as in democracy and modern logic—each one merging into its neighbor. Crude America must be withstood."8

Kilpatrick's criticisms gain added weight, from the standpoint of our present interest, when taken together with a review of Flexner by the leader of Kilpatrick's school, John Dewey, published in the spring of 1932. Sympathetic with Flexner's assaults against follies and distortions in higher education, he nevertheless protests that Flexner makes no attempt "to indicate the direction in which the American university might and should move." This can only be done, according to Dewey, if it is recognized that universities are a manifestation of the ethos of the national communities they serve.

We—the American people—are blindly trying to do something new in the history of educational effort. We are trying to develop universal education; in the process we are forced by facts to identify a universal education with an education in which the vocational quality is pervasive. Mr. Flexner's criticisms would have been as truthful and as drastic if his criterion had been a recognition of what underlies both the excellencies and the defects of our society and our education instead of one which looks, however unconsciously, to the dualism of the past and of other societies.9

Dewey's judgment means that the American tendency that comes closest to the German insistence on the deep ethical and political ramifications of pedagogical
arrangements is firmly committed to a uniquely American situation and mission in education.\textsuperscript{10} Dewey and his associates, as democrats and humanitarians, will be among the leaders in welcoming the German émigrés, but they will also expect them to shift rapidly from the old to the new context of problems.

In sum, the intellectual and cultural émigrés from Germany entered an academic landscape where there were both avid friends and harsh critics of the specialist, research-centered, performance-oriented, autonomous German university system, but where neither the one nor the other actually grasped the state of the question of \textit{Bildung}, as it was contested in the discourse of Weimar intellectuals, in the university and out.

\textbf{Bildung as Contested Legacy}

The present volume brings together a group of studies that variously explore the writings of several well-known members of the post-1933 German-speaking intellectual and cultural emigration against the background of the vicissitudes of \textit{Bildung} in exile. Some twenty figures are included, ranging from Thomas Mann and László Moholy-Nagy to Erwin Panofsky and Paul Lazarsfeld, with special emphasis on the so-called neo-humanist tendency variously oriented to Ernst Cassirer or Thomas Mann, as well as the indispensable cultural commentators, including Adorno, Horkheimer, Benjamin, and Kracauer. That several individuals on this list were not themselves university faculty does not mean that any of them were removed from the \textit{Bildung} controversy: the pervasiveness of the issue across the intellectual landscape is precisely the premise of the analysis. The aim is not, in any case, to rescue forgotten names but to explore an approach beyond the scope of past exile studies, to offer new help with the interpretation of texts and materials whose intrinsic value is not seriously in question. The idea is to read through the texts to the vicissitudes of \textit{Bildung}, and then to reconsider the resulting transparent palimpsest. There are a number of insuffi-
ciently explored questions to be addressed by this means, ranging from the puzzling success of so many émigrés as university teachers to the no less puzzling sense of disappointment that haunted many of the émigrés who were most successful in making notable careers. At a more complex level of analysis, there are new insights to be gained, on the one hand, about the inner structure of the bargaining processes generally discussed as acculturation: the unfinished \textit{Bildung} problem complex is usually neglected at the bargaining table. And, conversely, many obscurities or false notes in the writings of exile can be understood as documents of this practical aporia. Clearly, this issue is less likely to be present in cases where the condition of exile is effectively subsumed under patterns of international scientific migration, which were under way between Germany and the United States before Hitler came to power, supported in certain disciplines by the Rockefeller Foundation and other agencies dedicated to a global domain of \textit{Wissenschaft}. These cases, especially in the natural sciences, have recently been made the subject of important studies, but they should not be overgeneralized.\textsuperscript{11}

The individuals chosen for study here are members, with one or two exceptions, of what may be called the “Weimar generation,” whose formative experiences came after World War I\textsuperscript{12}; most are Jewish, at least by Nuremberg-law criteria, although at
most one or two oriented themselves to any measurable extent to the internal Jewish debates about Jewish identity and culture; and almost all can be referred not only to one or another academic discipline but also to the more diverse congeries of cultural networks that was characterized in Germany as die Intelligenz. In the contests about Bildung that marked the Weimar period, none simply aligned themselves with a conservative defense of the nineteenth-century canon and ideal, according to the conventionalized forms of which they were all themselves schooled, but there were sharp differences among them as to the extent to which and the ways through which the ethical and political demands of the old Bildung, should be reconstructed. Issues in contestation included above all the relations between Bildung and Enlightenment, on the one hand, and between Bildung and (artistic) modernism, on the other. The former division entailed, in the German context, questions about democracy and the legitimacy of the Weimar state, and the latter, questions about antibourgeois revolution. Peter Nettl has characterized intellectuals as constituting "structures of dissent," in relation to the primary institutions of disciplinary knowledge, and this is adequate to our cases, as long as it is clearly understood that dissent is not limited to any given political direction, and that it may not take the form of political discourse at all.13 In exile, arguably, nothing of this weighed as heavily as their common experiences and investments in a culture where the things they had learned, the things they studied, and the things they taught were widely believed to bear on the basic qualities of both individual and collective life. If nothing else, they had to explain a rejection of this culturist conception. Yet a number during the time of emigration hoped to influence events in Germany, perhaps to return, and several did so, in a few cases to positions of some prominence. The past and future of exile both figure in these studies of intellectuals in exile. The present-day literature on the concept and history of Bildung is large and accessible, and there is no need to retell here the story from Wilhelm von Humboldt to Eduard Spranger.14 The aim is simply to map the controversy during the last Weimar years, with some attention to its concentrated form in pedagogical and curricular discussions.

Mapping the Weimar Dispute about Bildung

To complete our introduction, however, we first offer a schematic diagram of the intellectual landscape at the point of departure, a characterization of the major alignments in Weimar Germany on the question of relations between Bildung and Wissenschaft. The outer perimeter is defined by Max Weber, whose heroic abandonment of Bildung for the sake of Wissenschaft, most vividly in his address on science shortly before his death in 1920, is the limiting case by reference to which much of the Weimar debate proceeded.15 Outside that boundary are scientific discourses whose self-reflection was confined to methodological issues and whose work served the Bildung debate largely as object lessons. Common to all of the authors enclosed by these bounds is a preoccupation with history, variously understood as both a prime constituent of and prime threat to Bildung. Yet the differences in treatment of that theme, generally subsumed under the heading of Historismus, do not lend themselves to easy classification, and they will be left for treatment in the separate studies. Within the diagram, then, it is useful to plot four locations by matching two variables familiar from intellectual history, and then to attach a distinct plane defined by
variable readings on a continuum of a different kind. On the four-fold table, then, one axis is labeled civilization and the other, politics. We separate thinkers whose concepts of Bildung are somehow reconciled with “civilization,” a term often associated in contemporary discourse with the French Enlightenment and poised as antithesis against Kultur, from thinkers who are more true to the historical legacy of Bildung as an alternative to the supposed unhistorical “intellectualism” of civilization and the Enlightenment, and within each of these types, we distinguish, on the other axis, those whose conception of Bildung is expressly political from those who disdain conflictual politics. Representative of the upper left quadrant on our hypothetical table is the sociologist, Karl Mannheim; for the upper right, we take Hans Freyer, who is both sociologist and philosopher of culture; on the lower left, we locate authors like Ernst Cassirer and Ernst Robert Curtius; and the crowded lower right quadrant is represented by the various voices of the George Circle and “Secret Germany,” as well as more pedantic voices of conservative opposition. It is perhaps emblematic of the discordant juxtapositions that are the subject of the present studies to force this complex assortment of intellectuals into the hostile confinements of so banal—and uncultivated—an analytical device. It is just as well, then, to disrupt the simplicity of the model with the addition of another dimension that is not susceptible to binary compartmentalization, the orientation to what may be called “revolutionary culture,” and that ranges from the unorthodox communist theorizing of the younger Georg Lukács, often revived by others during the Weimar years, with its reconceptualization of Bildung as class consciousness and its celebration of a revolutionary “new culture,” at one end of the (dis)continuum, to various antinomian or anarchist articulations of avant-garde artistic rationales, no less scornful of Lukács’s curious aesthetic conservatism than of the coordinated movements of his political associates. For present purposes, it will suffice to illustrate the four main alternatives on the principal dimensions, with emphasis on the quadrants that play a lesser part in the studies to follow but that remain an important part of the context.

Political Enlightenment as Bildung: Karl Mannheim

Our first striking marker, exemplifying a clear accommodation of both Enlightenment civilization and conflictual politics, is provided by a text arising in a specialist conference in 1932 devoted precisely to reinforcing the claims of sociology, a new and widely distrusted university discipline, to be accepted as a Wissenschaft in the desperate distribution struggles of the depression years. The speaker is one of the most polarizing—but also one of the most representative—figures of the age, Karl Mannheim. Probably drawing on the research of Hans Weil, whose book on the emergence of the concept of Bildung he selected for his own series, to appear immediately after Ideologie und Utopie,16 and implicitly answering critics like Ernst Robert Curtius and Eduard Spranger, who charged him with betrayal of the German Bildung ideal, Mannheim offers a conciliatory account of the state of the question in 1932, just months before his own forced emigration:

By specialized knowledge (Spezialwissen) we shall understand all the forms and contents of knowledge necessary for the solution of a scientific-technical or organizational task.
A knowledge whose advantage consists in its pure applicability and in its capacity of being separated from the purely personal is in essence always addressed to distinctively differentiated tasks in the social process, in a manner that is both particularistic and specialist. By Bildung knowledge (Bildungswissen), in contrast, we shall understand the tendency towards a coherent life-orientation, with a bearing upon the overall personality as well as upon the totality of the objective life-situation insofar as it can be surveyed at the time.17

Mannheim argued that sociology could not function as specialized Wissenschaft alone, and he maintained, audaciously—or, many thought, absurdly—that it was up to sociology in the present day to provide the “distinctive self-expansion of personality, together with the deepening of experiential dimensions, that was in large measure the meaning of the experience of Bildung for earlier generations.”18 If humanistic knowledge and the corresponding artistic culture were appropriate to the conditions of life of the defunctionalized aristocracy of the early nineteenth century and, in a different manner, of the passive and prosperous bourgeoisie later in the century, as Weil’s study argued, then sociological self-understanding and practical orientation could meet the needs of democratized mass populations, especially through the Bildung of new meritocratic elites capable of stemming the slide to emotional mass democracy.

Mannheim is especially worth citing in this connection, first, because his example shows that the concern for Bildung was by no means limited to antimodern and politically conservative writers, as witness also the domestic political rationale for the Hochschule für Politik, which was the scene of operation for younger Jewish intellectuals, several among whom emerged as “political scientists” in emigration,19 second, because he indicates that there was a common point to the concept, Bildung, despite conflict and fluidity about its contents during the Weimar years, and third, because he proposes, in effect, a peaceable division of labor between the two modes of knowledge, although he had no doubt as to which of the two complementary dimensions had the authority to draw the boundary lines. Common to all three elements is his determination to broker a deal between Bildung and Enlightenment, notwithstanding the enmity between them in a hundred years of Bildung discourse, an undertaking that was at one with his consistent support of the compromises constituting the Weimar constitution.20

Politics of the Will as Bildung: Hans Freyer

The second “political” compartment must be treated with subtlety, since it includes important thinkers who surprisingly paired the concepts of Enlightenment and Bildung, as Hegel had done in the Phenomenology, in order to decree that both are superceded. This is a motif, above all, in thinkers drawn to Martin Heidegger.21 Yet this gesture cannot be taken as face value precisely because of the extent to which the thought is defined by the characteristic vision of a total disruption and renewal [Aufbruch und Umbruch] precisely in the domain that is more widely conceptualized as Bildung. The supposed rejection of Bildung was an opening to a reintroduction of its key elements.

In the political form of such “existentialism,” Hans Freyer is a leading example. He deserves some careful attention in this introduction, precisely because the
complex dialogic relationship between him and leading émigré thinkers is overshadowed by the deep walls of separation erected by exile. Tactically allied with Mannheim against the proponents of a purely scientific sociology in 1932 but diametrically opposed to him on the bargain with the Enlightenment and Republic, Freyer pronounced his views on Bildung in a famous joint appearance with Carl Schmitt at a philosophers' congress in Davos in 1931. Bildung was obsolete, he proclaimed, while promulgating a radically new regime of Bildung, based on a diagnosis of a failure to provide the communal conjunction (Bindung) that knowledge as rhetoric should provide. Like Schmitt and Heidegger, who similarly attempted loyally—and failed—to inspire the Nazis with their related views of Bildung, Freyer was not divorced in Weimar from the intellectuals who subsequently became exiles. His aim is to outbid established "bourgeois" Bildung with a form that is revolutionary and all-encompassing, proclaimed under the name of "life."

Freyer denies that his conception of Bildung grounded on decision and will left Wissenschaft free, in the liberal manner, to pursue its autonomous way. Science is distinguished only by its more rigorous method. Its grounding must be the same as Bildung. Ultimately, Freyer asserted, Wissenschaft had to educate students for practical activity. This meant a schooling of the will by spiritually deepening the force of decision. The old humanistic, bourgeois idea of Bildung (and the free-floating intelligentsia) had to be replaced by a political Bildung in which the person became rooted in the nation and was responsibly bound to the decision of the state. The old forms of education that focused on the totality of personality had to be replaced by those that disciplined the will for the tasks at hand. Students had to attain a sense of concrete duty, to be prepared to sacrifice, to dedicate their total person to nation and state. The state in question, needless to say, could not be the pluralistic, Enlightenment-oriented constitutional regime of Weimar. Freyer is the second prime locational marker on our map.

**Bildung against "Politics": Ernst Robert Curtius and Eduard Spranger**

Although the Weimar dispute about Bildung extended deep into the discourses of history, philosophy, and philology, the challenges of sociology posed by both Mannheim and Freyer provided a central theme, above all because sociology figured so large in the cultural policies of the most influential universities minister of the Weimar era, Carl H. Becker. Sociology, Becker thought, could provide the common civil understanding that would enable individuals to recognize themselves through their dealings with others as peers and partners, without the discredited elitism and romanticism of the older conception. A sociological culture, moreover, would foster respect for diversity, as it encouraged individuals to take distance from themselves without fear of losing themselves. The individual subject of Bildung would reappear as a social being capable of being molded into a citizen; the universalistic assets of culture would be recognized as elements of social cooperation; and the activism integral to Bildung would reveal itself as civic virtue. Leading roles in the public struggle against Becker's design were played by Georg von Below, a historian, Eduard Spranger, the philosopher best-known as an authority on Humboldt, and the noted Heidelberg critic of French literature, Ernst Robert Curtius.
The last-named is of special interest here, both because his devotion to French culture sharply separated him from the continuators of the anti-Enlightenment slogans of the “Spirit of 1914,” and marked him as well, in the cultural politics of Weimar, as an unpolitical but comparatively moderate critic of the Republic, and because of the wider publicity of his views among non-university intellectuals. Although the quadrant also includes neo-Kantian philosophers as well as classicists attentive to republican currents in ancient (and Renaissance) literatures, Curtius will serve as marker for the class, with the exposition supported by incidental comparisons with both Spranger and Mannheim.

Both Curtius and Spranger brought the discussion of the problematic relationship of Bildung to science and the sociopolitical sphere directly back to the source, since both first of all tried to assess the status of Humboldt’s ideal in their time. Both endorsed Humboldt’s emphasis on the need for organic harmony between individual freedom and supra-individual connections. Although Spranger, in accordance with historicist assumptions, wrote that the national culture was an individuality with a unified objective spirit, Curtius drew on the traditional humanism of the Rhineland instead of German historicism. Both believed the purpose of Bildung was the development of the individual as a cultural-ethical personality, who had to develop in the soil of objective value contents. Curtius wrote: “We must return to the original foundation and beginning of our tradition and again learn the elements of culture.” With that specification as to the cultural source, he agreed with Spranger’s contention that education was “the cultural activity that strives to bring about an unfolding of subjective culture in developing individuals, by means of an evaluatively guided contact with a given objective culture and the activation of a genuine, ethically requisite cultural ideal.” The larger “organic” totality relied on the Bildung of the individual for its realization. Spranger described this reciprocal relationship as the “infusion of the [individual] spirit with the [individual] soul and the infusion of the soul with the spirit. Where this succeeds in a productive sense, there is Bildung.”

Spranger and Curtius sought to restore the nineteenth-century character of the university in the face of the new Weimar reform movement. While they criticized the parliamentary democracy of the Republic to differing degrees, they were united in the belief that democratic forces had to be kept out of the university and that this meant putting the relatively new discipline of sociology in its proper place as a clear subordinate to traditional disciplines such as philosophy and history. Similarly, neither writer considered sociology as a kind of science that could be a fit partner for a coalition to restore Bildung. For Spranger, the rejection extended to all modern sciences. He wrote that Wissenschaft had come to mean a mere positivistic and utilitarian specialization oriented toward the adaptation of practical abilities to the material here and now. He saw sociology as the epitome of this orientation. In addition to its mechanistic methodology, it limited ethical questions to those of social forms. When this concern for the practical removed a will to values (Wertwille), he asserted, the result was relativism.

Hostile to Becker’s proteges and projects, Curtius and Spranger looked beyond the politicized Weimar state for a solution to the cultural crisis of Weimar. Spranger called for a renewal of culture carried by new forces, notably the youth movement, which he apostrophized in wholistic terms, without regard to the political character
of the “renewal” movements he had in mind or of the deep cleavages within the youth cohort. The new culture would be based on a larger ideal tied to both the achievements of the past as well as to the meaning provided by religion. Curtius in contrast shared Mannheim’s conviction that the primary responsibility rested with the intellectuals, but he believed that their proper contribution was precisely the restoration of faith in the Western cultural heritage that Mannheim considered obsolete. The food for this Bildung was to be humanism reinspired by the Renaissance, a humanism that came from the creative intensity of life and was connected with religious belief. Warning that Germany should not make an abrupt break with the past, Curtius also looked to the academic tradition. The more democracy brought the masses to the fore, the greater the need for a restored humanistic elite and its secure field of operation in the university would become.32

In this connection, then, Curtius gave voice to his hostility to Jews who do not choose either the route of full assimilation to the host culture or wholehearted traditionalism. “We hope that youth—German youth—will resist all attempts by scientific authorities,” Curtius continues, “to dissuade them from an appreciation of greatness and idealism.”33 It is not necessary to question the sincerity of Curtius’s rejection of racialist anti-Semitism or his abhorrence for the National Socialists, to emphasize the intimate connections between even this moderate and comparatively modernist evocation of the older Bildung tradition with furiously anti-Socialist and anti-Jewish themes, a consideration doubtless of moment to many of the emigrants who had been otherwise sympathetic to Curtius’s urbane literary approaches.

Above Bildung and Politics: The George Circle

Youth served as an even more militant slogan in the antipolitical and anti-Enlightenment Bildungspolitik of the fourth quadrant of our diagram, at least among the most representative figures, but it was a youth configured according to the leader-follower design pervasive in the prewar German youth movement and crystallized in the remarkably attractive George Circle and its extensive penumbra. Karl Mannheim wrote a compelling account of Heidelberg as a cultural center divided between the realms of Max Weber’s sociology and the George Circle; and Erich Kahler, on the periphery of the circle, effectively launched his public career with an attack on Max Weber’s Wissenschaft als Beruf; a publication that also played a key part in the disputes already surveyed.34 Yet arguments about Bildung in the university hardly penetrated into the inner poetic circle.

The issues were translated to a distinctive sphere, ostensibly remote from the realms of politics or civilizational currents. The struggle was indeed about the Bildung of the youth, but the question of Wissenschaft was simply pushed aside. Although Max Weber may be seen to have asserted the heroism of an irresistible modernity devoid of “meaning” as the term figured in the “crisis” debate, a condition where science is a vocation without being a “calling” in some transcendent sense, George and his circle promised a calling to a secret and ultimate Bildung, outbidding all other invocations of the term. George’s pronouncement, “From me, no road leads to Wissenschaft,” cites the contrast central to the wider debate.35 but he offers no more explanation of what he means by Wissenschaft than he does of Bildung. The only
thing certain was that it would transform humanity. The inflated metaphors of “life,” “youth,” and the “organic” suggested to the chosen that they were already living in the predawn of that future. An “icon [Bildnis] of the master” seemed to suffice for their Bildung. Bildung required neither universities or other institutions nor any specified contents. Bildung was rather to resemble a religious epiphany, as was manifest in the discussions within the circle about correct iconic practices, as well as in the belief that the exclusivity of poetics could take the place of all Wissenschaft testify to this. The Bildung of the few was modeled on the “circle” of Jesus’ disciples, the reading of a poem was a neo-religious liturgy, and the abstinence from politics was a matter of principle. It was precisely in this respect that they considered themselves superior to the “old” sciences, and their claims to a capacity for Bildung.

There were parallels to the George Circle, as with the poetic pretensions and the vast ambitions of Rudolf Borchard, which are not easy to distinguish from it at this distance in time. They all present themselves as unpolitical, but nevertheless seek to exercise a direct influence on the political through their elite “few.” Of course, the political does not refer here to anything as mundane as social legislation or anti-inflationary policy. The political has Bildung as its aim, and it is supposed to draw in ever wider circles, beginning from “above” by means of the few. It is hard to avoid noticing the exaggerated self-importance of this project, but it is no less important to remark its extraordinary appeal to outstanding intellectuals at the time. Since it was impossible to speak of Bildung without simultaneously alluding to the educated middle class for whom the concept was iconic, it was necessary to widen the distance. They spoke of “unconditional renewal” and they were not economical with expressions of totality and the direct apprehension of essences. The specialization characteristic of modern orders of knowledge seemed to be suspended, and the “essential,” to come into view.

With all this diffuse intensity, it is no wonder that the ways of the George followers could as easily terminate in the “new” state as in “inner emigration” or exile. The fault lines among the individual members could not be compellingly predicted, and it was not clear to the participants themselves. That the members of the circle returned to the Master’s ideas after 1945 is further evidence of the striking persistence of the all-too German controversy about Bildung, from which this fourth quadrant on the intellectual landscape cannot be excluded.

An Overview of the Studies in this Volume

No group active during the last imperial years in Germany and the fourteen years of Weimar was more intimately identified with the slogan of Bildung, expressly treated as remote from specialized sciences of the university and as core of an intimate association of individuals, than the so-called circle around the poet, Stefan George. The members forced into exile after 1933 could not avoid decisions about this motif so demandingly present in their earlier lives, and they exemplify a significant range of alternative ways of managing this unshakable legacy, encapsulated in an elitist conception of “Secret Germany” that also resonated with many intellectuals drawn to National Socialism. In a brief essay grounded in his extensive scholarly investigations of George and his circle, Ernst Osterkamp evokes and analyses this extreme exile experience.
Irving Wohlfarth, in turn, closely marks Walter Benjamin’s dialectical conversion of “Secret Germany” into a location defined by “political repression and the denial of a public voice.” Although Benjamin’s exile ended in death before he could join most of the individuals studied in this volume in one of the secure English-speaking nations, his years in Germany had been a constant preparation for exile, and the production of his brief years in French exile became a vital impulse in the self-confrontation of such disparate prominent exile figures as Hannah Arendt and Theodor Adorno. Yet, as Wohlfarth shows, Benjamin to an important extent kept his own secret, leaving it to be differently unriddled in different times. This Bildung has to be painfully extracted from the given materials; and it bestows no status. With all the hermeticism and rebelliousness of Benjamin’s position, as Wohlfarth shows, he profoundly affects the debate about Enlightenment, politics, Jews—and Germany.

Reinhard Mehring presents Thomas Mann as a writer who brings these issues more into the light, challenging the thought that myth and humanism are contradictory, first of all through the humanistic prototypes that people his novels but secondly also in philosophical essays, whose arguments are explicated by several exile philosophers and in the course of Mann’s correspondence with Theodor W. Adorno. With the end of exile, as such, Mann’s humanistic Bildung project was largely abandoned by those who had expounded it earlier, and his extraordinary authority abruptly withered, especially within the new German literary scholarship.

A former secretary and close friend of Thomas Mann stood out, according to Gerhard Lauer, as a lifelong witness to a distinctive idealization of a “revolutionary” refounding of German Bildung, having chosen Germany above his native Austria, which he deemed polluted by Habsburg. In principle, Kahler made no concessions to the intellectual currents of his place of asylum, except insofar as his self-popularizations served a taste for cultural uplift. Here was an exile in the vestibule.

The contrast could hardly be sharper than with another émigré who similarly came from former Hapsburg territory to Germany, the artist, Lázló Moholy-Nagy, who enjoyed the success of a cosmopolitan figure. Anna Wessely shows how he was moved to leave Germany, where he had earlier come as exile from Hungary and how the terms of his welcome in America nevertheless compelled him to abandon the Bildung project of the Bauhaus, the aim that was of special value to him.

Another group of avant-garde émigré artists illuminate a very different aspect of the American exile scene. According to Laurent Jeanpierre, the exiled surrealists are linked to the aesthetician of the Institute of Social Research by the question of acknowledging the inescapable inner connection between Bildung and myth without a romantic transcendence of practical enactment in the realm of concrete social possibilities, notwithstanding the failure of both to recognize the hidden parallels.

Gregory Moynahan moves the discussion to the inner philosophical structure of Ernst’s Cassirer’s ambiguous accomplishment in providing a context for negotiations between certain émigré thinkers and their American hosts. This reading requires a reconsideration of Cassirer’s famous debate with Martin Heidegger in Davos in 1927. Cassirer’s further elaboration of his argument—and its application to large political themes—shows clear and influential marks of his engaged encounter with the philosophical setting in his places of exile, and his service as mediator in the transition to the new frame of reference is especially clear in the work and reception of Erwin Panofsky.
An unexpected affinity can be observed, according to Kay Schiller, between Cassirer and the Renaissance scholar, Paul Oskar Kristeller, whose rigorous historical method precluded in principle the more symbolic rendering of humanist ideas that Cassirer occasionally ventured in his writings in exile. At issue in the “humanistic turn” was the transfer to the United States of the debate about a “Third Humanism” that had taken authoritarian and elitist form in Germany. Cassirer and Kristeller came together in insisting on the philosophical seriousness of the Renaissance figures they studied and in rejecting their invocation in aid of stereotyped positions in the old Bildungs debate.

In his extended and extensively researched essay on Siegfried Kracauer, Jerry Zaslove brings forward the profound soberness with which this essayist, a convenor and participant of the Weimar Bildung debate, explores the experience of exile—and Holocaust—notably in displacing the destructive and wordy yearning for community with the distanced but infinitely attentive view of the photographer. Interestingly, Kracauer’s work was completed, not by Theodor Adorno, with whom he had been in extended conversation, but by Paul Oskar Kristeller, who evidently found him a kindred spirit precisely in this prophetic ataraxia.

Jack Jacobs contends that the stark recognition of anti-Semitism as focal point of attention by the Horkheimer-Adorno group, during the years of exile, mediated the displacement of the theoretical focal point from Marxist social theory to a distinctive dialectical cultural-political configuration. Not only their reflections on the German spectacle, seen from a distance, but also the exigencies of their client search and service contributed to this reorientation. The conditions of life in exile manifested itself on more than one level.

The complexity of the exile situation of this exemplary group is made evident by an account of their anti-Semitism research project from Thomas Wheatland’s competing perspective, where the emphasis is rather on the effort to meet the methodological expectations of American social science clients. The emphasis here is on the contested importance of the empirical methodologist—and fellow-exile—Paul Lazarsfeld for their work, on issue of particular interest because it highlights the question of the extent to which participants in exile revised their memories in the changed contexts of later times.

The last chapter, like the earlier one on Thomas Mann, moves on to the end of exile. The conjunction of politics and culture, both in the diagnosis of the crisis and in the projection of its negation, was central to Adorno, Alfonso Soltner shows, in the Bildungs practice in Germany, to which Adorno returned after the years of exile. Adorno’s strategy of “political culturism” is a sign of the breach produced by exile and of the subtlety required to work effectively across the gap.

Notes
6. B. H. Bode, “Currents and Cross-Currents in Higher Education,” The Journal of Higher Education 2, 7 (October 1931): 374–379. David Snedden similarly chides Flexner for fixing on an obsolete pattern. Writing in an evolutionist mode, Snedden suggests that the changes that Flexner decries may well be experimental steps toward a realization of Flexner’s high ideals in a manner appropriate to emerging social conditions. (“Functions of the University,” Journal of Higher Education 2, 7 (October 1931): 384–389.)
8. William H. Kilpatrick, “Universities: American, English, and German,” The Journal of Higher Education 2, 7 (October 1931): 357–363. In the early 1930s, Kilpatrick and his associates were concerned above all with the conjunction between progressive education and radical social change, and the German connection tended to take the form of collaboration with German critics of the existing Bildung regime. See Herman Röhrs, “Progressive Education in the United States and Its Influence on Related Educational Developments in Germany,” in Jürgen Heideking, Marc Depaepe, Jürgen Herbst (eds.), Mutual Influences on Education: Germany and the United States in the Twentieth Century. Paedagogica Historica 33, 1 (1997): 45–68.


23. With special thanks to Colin Loader, the exposition of Freyer’s concept of Bildung draws heavily on Loader and Kettler, *Karl Mannheim’s Sociology as Political Education.*
24. See Loader and Kettler, *Karl Mannheim’s Sociology as Political Education*. The account of Eduard Spranger and Ernst Robert Curtius also draws extensively on this book.


27. Curtius, *Deutscher Geist in Gefahr*, 63.


31. For an invaluable record of the bitter impression that Spranger and his ideas made on an emigre intellectual when he presented them in Japan, as cultural promoter of the Axis alliance, see Löwith, *Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933*, 112–115. The document gains special piquancy from the fact that Löwith’s eventual position, after his final, painful break with a Heideggerian Nietzsche, resembles that of Spranger in Weimar.

32. Curtius, *Deutscher Geist in Gefahr*, 20, 42, 46, 56, 73–78, 120–121.


35. Edgar Salin, *Um Stefan George* (Godesberg: Küpper, 1948), 256.
